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Abstract 
The paper uses a unique dataset comprising the population of new ventures that enter 
the UK market in 1998.  We argue that we would expect the effect of market 
concentration on firm survival to be different according to whether an industry is 
static (low entry and exit) or dynamic.  In our empirical analysis we find support for 
this hypothesis.  Industry concentration rates reduce the survival of new plants but 
only in markets marked by low entry and exit rates.  Specifically, a 10 percent 
increase in the 5-firm concentration ratio or the Herfindahl index in a dynamic 
market, raises the survival rate of new ventures by approximately 2 percent.  Our 
results suggest greater leniency towards more dominant firms in industries showing 
buoyant entry and exit rates.  
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1.  Introduction 
One of the main aims of competition policy is the prevention of excessive market 
power and the abuse thereof.
1
  The assumption behind these policies is that high 
market power, or high rates of concentration, can be detrimental not only to consumer 
welfare but also to the performance of other rivals in the industry.  Related empirical 
evidence does suggest that high rates of competition and market power are indeed 
negatively correlated with entry, growth and survival of firms (Caves, 1998).  Our 
paper contributes to this literature by making a simple, yet important point.  We argue 
and provide evidence that the effects of concentration are different for dynamic and 
static industries.  We define markets as dynamic if they are characterised by high rates 
of entry and exit, otherwise they are considered static. 
In order to make this point we focus on one particular aspect of firm performance, 
namely survival.
2
  This is an important topic not only because plant survival shapes 
the competitive landscape of the economy, but also because the persistence of jobs is 
linked to the survival of plants.  Both of these issues can be expected to impact on 
welfare in the economy.  Specifically, we look at the interactions between industry 
dynamism (aggregate entry and exit) and measures of industry concentration and find 
that where dynamism is high (defined as dynamic markets), industry concentration 
helps new entrants to survive.  The distinction between static and dynamic markets 
largely seeks to distinguish between different dominant forms of competition (see 
Audretsch et al. 2001), in particular situations where price drives competition (static 
markets) from those where product and technological innovation play more prominent 
roles (dynamic markets). 
We use an exhaustive database of UK VAT registrations from 1997-2002 for our 
analysis of firm survival.  One advantage of our data is that it is essentially a census of 
all businesses including the smallest of entrants.  This is considered extremely 
important for accurate description of entry and exit, as these are often small firm 
phenomena.  Secondly, our data is at the plant level which is arguably more 
appropriate for an analysis of survival since failure of individual plants making up an 
establishment otherwise goes unrecorded. 
The policy implication of our paper is that high levels of concentration and large 
market shares by incumbents do not necessarily have to be of concern to policy 
makers as far as the survival of new entrants is concerned.  What really matters is 
what type of market a firm is operating in – whether it is static or dynamic.  This is an 
important finding, as competition policy generally emphasises the possible effects of 
concentration on static, rather than dynamic markets (Audretsch et al., 2001).   
                                                           
1
 For the European Union, see Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty.   
2
 Previous studies on plant or firm survival that considered the importance of concentration include 
Wagner (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata et al. (1995) and Görg and Strobl (2003).   
 5 
We structure our paper as follows.  In the next section we discuss our argument for 
why concentration and market dynamism matter for survival.  Section 3 sets out the 
empirically model.  This is followed in section 4 by a discussion of the data and some 
summary statistics.  The empirical analysis in Section 5 is followed by a summary 
which concludes the paper. 
2. Background to Concentration, Dynamism and Survival 
There is little consensus in the literature on whether incumbent firms challenge 
entrants or not.  The conventional view is that industry concentration is associated 
with incumbent monopoly power and to this end can pose a significant competitive 
threat for new entrants, i.e., reduce their survival chances.  In line with this argument, 
applying market concentration as a proxy for market power exercised by existing 
firms, Audretsch et al. (1991) observe that survival falls with concentration.
3
  
However, another scenario is possible.  Empirical studies indicate that new entrants 
frequently introduce new innovation to the market and thus pose a threat to 
incumbents (e.g., Geroski, 1995; Audretsch, 1995a,b).  If incumbents are vulnerable 
to the innovation of new entrants and assuming that some level of monopolistic x-
inefficiency has crept into incumbents (Leibenstein, 1966) then high concentration 
may pose a competitive cushion and permit entrants to successfully contest a market – 
and increase their chances of survival compared to entrants in other markets.  In fact, 
entry into a less concentrated industry with more efficient incumbents, may pose a 
much more testing environment for entrants.   
Examples of where x-inefficient incumbents unwittingly ceded market share to new 
entrants abound.  The new ventures launched by Richard Branson and his Virgin 
group of new ventures actually targeted highly concentrated industries where 
incumbents were not used to competition and were slow to respond (DTI, 1996).  
Likewise, the new entrants who introduced the ‘low cost travel’ innovation to the 
European airline industry benefited from the fact that incumbents were monopolistic 
x-inefficient firms (such as British Airways and Aer Lingus).  The latter had relied on 
landing slots to block entry and had over time become highly cost inefficient and 
moreover, were sufficiently inflexible to take a very long time to bring their costs 
down to competitive levels.  This provided crucial breathing space for once small new 
entrants such as Ryanair and EasyJet to survive (and grow to become large firms).  
Therefore, either way, market concentration is not necessarily a bad thing for new 
entrants when competition is innovation-based competition or when x-inefficiencies 
make incumbents unable to respond to new entry.
4
 
                                                           
3
 Mata et al. (1995) qualify this finding by observing that very new entrants (those less than 3 years 
old) affect market share so negligibly that their entry goes unchallenged by incumbents. 
4
 We could also look at innovation based competition from the perspective of differentiated products.  
Consider the price that smart new entrants with differentiated products can charge when they 
encounter inelastic demand from customers. If the survival of new entrants is enhanced because of 
 6 
If we accept this argument, then the next question is whether and how the direct effect 
of competition is moderated by the dynamism of market entry and exit.  Since entry 
and exit rates are highly correlated, we speak of static markets as those where there is 
little entry and exit.  Similarly dynamic markets exhibit high entry and exit rates.
5
  We 
would expect to see different effects of competition on business survival in these two 
different types of markets.   
More specifically, the distinction between static and dynamic markets largely seeks to 
distinguish between different dominant forms of competition (see Audretsch et al. 
2001).  In particular, to distinguish situations where price drives competition (static 
markets) from those where product and technological innovation play more prominent 
roles (dynamic markets).
6
  Thus, in more static environments where new entrants 
cannot shield themselves from price competition through product and technological 
innovation (differentiation), the market power of incumbents associated with high 
industry concentration is likely to pose a major threat to new entrants; implying a 
negative relationship between concentration and entrants’ survival probabilities.  By 
contrast, in more dynamic settings where higher levels of innovation provide a means 
for entrants to circumvent the competitive advantages of possibly x-inefficient 
incumbents, high industry concentration may in fact boost the viability of entrants and 
improve their survival prospects.  
To summarise, the potential for market concentration to induce X-inefficiencies 
implies that it is not always harmful to new venture survival.  Moreover, market 
concentration is only expected to confer an advantage to incumbents over new 
entrants when competition is cost based, i.e., more usually when operating in a static 
market.  If cost based competition is a feature of high concentration levels coupled 
with low industry dynamism, only under such conditions will market share harm the 
survival of new ventures.  This can be summarised in the following Proposition: 
Proposition: The impact of industry concentration on the survival of new entrants is 
more likely to be negative when markets are static and positive when markets are 
dynamic.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the novelty of their product (a genuine innovation), consumer demand is sufficiently inelastic thus 
allowing new firms a cushion against price cuts from incumbents. Caves and Pugel (1980) suggest 
that small firms actively use product innovation as a way of garnering market share in industries with 
high minimum efficient scale.  Product novelty increases the price a new entrant is able to charge its 
customer base, before customers switch to the next best alternative (incumbent firm’s product). 
5
 One explanation for this finding that new firms enter despite high industry exit rates (high observed 
correlation between entry with exit rates) is that any individual firm is unaware of its survival 
prospects ex ante but becomes aware ex post of its survival chances.  This is the conclusion of 
learning theories in the context of market entry and exit (e.g., Jovanovic, 1982; Pakes and Ericson, 
1998). 
6
 As Geroski (1995) observes, it is these latter markets which are characterised by high levels of firm 
entry and exit.   
 7 
3. Empirical model 
We investigate this issue empirically by modelling a new entrant’s hazard of exiting, 
conditional on a number of covariates.  In order to put our study into context, Table 1 
summarises some of the stylised facts about business survival and other covariates.  
There is a consensus that size in general, and attaining minimum efficient scale 
(MES) specifically, raises a firm’s survival prospects.
7
  Hopenhayn’s (1992) model 
ties in with the intuition in Gibrat’s law that greater size implies a greater capability to 
capitalise on new opportunities.  Analogously, in the ‘learning models’ first advanced 
by Jovanovic (1982) and built upon by Pakes and Ericson (1998), hazard rates decline 
with firm size because larger firms have a higher rational expectation of survival.  A 
significant body of the empirical literature on the survival of new entrants in 
manufacturing industries has found a positive effect of firms’ start-up size on 
survival.
8
 
Accordingly, we include firm size at start-up in our empirical model.  Moreover, 
industry growth has been found to enhance survival as firms in growing industries 
may be more likely to avoid competitive pressure from incumbents (e.g., Audretsch, 
1991).  Hence, we also include this variable in our estimation.  Furthermore, 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) argue that survival should be higher in industries that 
are characterised by high wage rates, as wages may proxy for labour related sunk 
costs such as training.  We also include the median industry wage in our analysis.   
In line with much of the literature we use a standard Cox proportional hazard model 
where we model the probability of firm failure, f.
9
  As in previous studies, failure is 
denoted by firms exiting the sample.   In other words, firms enter in time t and who no 
longer are VAT registered in time t+k are noted as having failed.  The proportional 
hazard of a firm failing in time (t) is formulated as  
hf (t) = h (t; xf) = h0 (t) exp (X’f β) 
where X comprises a vector of variables impacting on survival based which have been 
informed by past research (Table 1 and foregoing discussion).  These are minimum 
efficient scale, MES, size, S, dynamism, D, growth, G and industry wage, W.
10
  The 
term h0 (t) represents the baseline hazard function which describes the probability of 
death conditional on the firm having survived until time t following market entry.   
 
                                                           
7
 See Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) for a review of this literature 
8
 Evans (1987), Hall (1987) and Audretsch (1991, 1995) have found a positive relationship between 
survival and firm start-up size for US manufacturing industries.  Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes 
(1995) find similar evidence for Portuguese manufacturing.    
9
 See, e.g., Disney et al. (2003), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata et al. (1995).   
10
 We note that because we examine the survival prospect of cohort, age is invariant over time and is 
therefore excluded. 
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Table 1 
Key covariate Contributer Prediction / Observation 
Size (Size) & MES Hall (1987) 
Evans (1987a; 1987b) 
Dunne et al. (1989) 
Acs and Audretsch (1990) 
Scherer (1980) 
Hopenhayn (1992) 
Jovanovic (1982)  
Pakes and Ericson(1998) 
δSi / δSizei > 0 
Growth (G) Audretsch (1991) δSik / δGk > 0 
Industry Wage (W) Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) δSik / δWk > 0 
Dynamism (D) Geroski (1995) Dynamism is a feature of the product 
life cycle and hence every industry at 
some stage.   Industries do not remain 
dynamic. Dynamism depresses survival 
rates. 
δSi / δDk < 0 
High entry persists until entry pushes the 
net income of the marginal entrant to Y 
= 0 
Technology (T) and 
Dynamism  
Audretsch, (1995a; 1995b) 
Mata et al, (1995) 
Dynamism  (high entry and exit) a 
feature of industries with high levels of 
technological change 
(1) Concentration (C) Audretsch et al. (1991) 
Caves, (1998) 
 
Mata et al. (1995) 
δSik / δCk < 0 
 
  
δSik / δCk = 0 for firms less than 3 years 
old 
(2) 
Concentration (C)  
 
Weiss, 1976; (1979)  
Leibenstein, (1966)  
 
δSik / δCk < 0 does not hold if P > 
Production Cost.  Instead survival is an 
increasing function of concentration and 
market share in the presence of X-
inefficiencies i.e. δSik / δCk > 0 
Concentration (C)and 
Dynamism (D) 
This paper δSik / δCk > 0 with high levels of D 
δSik / δCk < 0 with low levels of D 
 S denotes firm survival, lowercase i and k denotes firm and industry sector respectively 
An innovation of our analysis is our focus on the effects of market concentration on 
survival under different competitive regimes.  Accordingly the hazard ratios 
describing the marginal effect of concentration on failure rates must be allowed to 
vary according to whether an industry is denoted as dynamic or static.  It follows that 
the validity of any split regression must be evaluated compared to a standard pooled 
regression by interacting our dynamism dummy against all model covariates and 
comparing the F test of the standard vis-à-vis the augmented model (the unconstrained 
model allowing the marginal effects to change under different conditional for market 
dynamism). 
 9 
Consistent with standard practice in analyses of this kind, our approach must consider 
potential for variation in survival rates across different industry sectors.  Accordingly, 
we treat each 2-digit SIC code as a separate stratum and allow the baseline hazard 
function to vary across these different strata.  We should further note that the standard 
errors estimated in our analyses allow for clustering to occur on an individual firm 
basis.  Accordingly, we use the robust measure of variance in our estimations.  In so 
doing, we recognise that any firm can be expected to behave in a systematic way, and 
that errors across years therefore, are correlated. 
4.  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
Our data is drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) database at 
the UK Office for National Statistics.
11
  This register captures VAT registered 
businesses and as such comprises about 98 percent of UK business activity.
12
  The 
advantage of using data from the register is twofold.  Firstly it is highly 
representative, given that it covers almost the population of UK firms and does not 
suffer from biases induced by sampling.  This latter point is especially important in 
duration studies, where over-sampling of large firms in comparison to small firms 
underestimates the real amount of movement in an economy, since entry and exit is 
mostly a small firm phenomenon.  Secondly, the register identifies businesses at the 
local unit level.  Barnes and Martin (2002) define this as the “individual site or 
workplace (factory, shop etc.) at which activity takes place” (p. 37).  This is for most 
cases the level of the plant.  Our data is comprised entirely of single plant firms so 
exit implies firm as well as plant closure.   
Higher levels of aggregation (establishment level) used to identify unique firms 
within the UK Annual Respondents Database (ARD, drawn from mostly larger firms 
within the IDBR) has up to now made it difficult for researchers to investigate plant 
exit.  An establishment can consist of more than one local unit (plant) and, hence the 
exit of only one local unit may remain undetected in case the establishment remains 
alive (albeit with a smaller number of local units).
13
  It is also difficult to pinpoint 
whether the exit of an establishment from the data was caused by the failure of all 
local units belonging to the enterprise.  Alternatively, the exit of an establishment 
could be induced by the failure of a large and important local unit which in turn 
caused the whole enterprise to exit from the data.  Notwithstanding the exit of the 
large and important local unit, any sister units could have remained operational if they 
had been independent entities rather than been part of an enterprise group.  To put it 
simply: an examination of local units is the simplest and arguably most appropriate 
                                                           
11
  Access to this data is possible under controlled conditions on site at ONS offices. 
12
   See Barnes and Martin (2002) for an overview of this data. 
13
  While the number of local units is in principle observable a reduction in the number may not only 
be due to exit of local units but could merely be due to an internal reorganisation within an 
enterprise that may consist of more than one establishments. 
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way to examine entry and exit when we need to directly attribute entry and exit to the 
unit under examination. 
Representativeness and research relevance come at a cost however:  While the IDBR 
contains a reasonably exhaustive listing of all firms from all sectors of the UK 
economy, knowledge about the features of these firms is limited to sectoral and 
employment information.  To remedy this information shortfall, we import 
information at a sectoral level on wages and market structure from the ARD data.  
This lets us describe the composition of the sector in which our firms operate and 
report, inter alia, industry concentration ratios. 
Our data extends for a 6 year period, 1997 to 2002.  Focussing on this period is due to 
one important reason: since 1997, the ARD data cover services as well as 
manufacturing industries in the UK, while before that year only manufacturing data 
was available.  As an important innovation of our paper is to consider services 
alongside manufacturing, we analyse data from 1997 onwards.   
However, this translates into a relatively short year survival horizon for the cohort of 
firms who appear in the data for the first time.  Data for 1997 is essentially used as a 
criterion that allows us to identify new entrants (present in 1998 but not in 1997) and 
data for 2002 allows us to identify real, uncensored exits (present in 2001 but not in 
2002).  Accordingly, we limit our duration analysis to a 3 year time window when we 
have accounted for left- and right-hand side censoring and represented failures that 
arise in 1998 (entry year) as happening at the beginning of the following year.
14
   
Fortunately, given the high level of attrition of start-ups in the earliest phases of their 
operation (almost 50 percent of start-ups exited within these 3 years) even within a 
relatively short time span we manage to capture a high level of early stage exits.  This 
pattern most likely arises from our ability to include low quality, under-capitalised, 
start-ups when using the IDBR data.  Given the comprehensive nature of the data, we 
are confident that this data is representative. 
Since our analysis focuses on exit from industry sectors, we first report exit levels for 
the cohort of UK plants entering in 1998, tracking the number of exits from 1998 until 
2001.
15
  Table 2 presents the development of industry level exit rates, calculated as 
number of exiting firms in industry j relative to the total number of firms in the 
industry.  The average percentage of exits across all firms in the database is about 8 
percent per year.
16
  This average is slightly higher in manufacturing than in services 
sector.  Overall, this suggests that only a minority of firms across the broad spectrum 
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  As is customary in survival analyses of this type with ‘simultaneous’ entry and exit. 
15
  We cannot calculate the value of exits for 2002 because firm’s survival is right censored at this 
date. 
16
 This compares with an average of 6.5% found by Baldwin and Gorecki (1991) for Canadian 
manufacturing industries.  Dunne and Hughes (1994) report an average death rate of 20.5% in their 
UK data for 1975-85, however, their data comprises only a sample of 2000 quoted and unquoted 
companies (mainly large) in the UK financial and non-financial companies.   
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of UK industry exits in any year.  As such, dynamism at a sectoral level appears to 
happen at the fringes of industry in general, and an examination of all industry exits 
suggests some inertia.   
Table 2: Mean Exit Rates by Year (standard deviation in parentheses) 
 
Year All sectors Manufacturing Services 
    
1998 0.078 0.086 0.078 
 (0.052) (0.057) (0.053) 
    
1999 0.088 0.094 0.088 
 (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) 
    
2000 0.088 0.092 0.087 
 (0.059) (0.059) (0.060) 
    
2001 0.081 0.083 0.081 
 (0.059) (0.052) (0.059) 
    
Source: own calculations based on ONS data 
This inertia seen across UK industry masks the dynamism that arises within cohorts of 
new ventures, however.  Accordingly, we would expect that annual exit rates within 
the grouping of new ventures should be much higher, given the greater financial 
fragility and unproven track-record of new ventures.  Figure 1 and Figure 2 trace the 
hazard rates for our 1998 cohort of UK firms as Kaplan-Meier functions.  Attrition is 
recorded for 3 analysis times and this corresponds to 1999, 2000 and 2001 
respectively.
17
  We can see from the exit function that almost 25 percent of entrants 
have died in the year of entry, culminating in a rate of almost 50 percent for the third 
year of existence, an exit rate in line with others documented for UK manufacturing 
industries.
18
  We moreover split our cohort depending on whether sectoral entry rates 
at a sectoral level exceed median sectoral entry rates.  This allows us to capture 
possible differences in attrition according as firms enter markets characterised by low 
and high levels of dynamism respectively.   
We see from Figure 1 that firms entering industries with above average entry rates 
where minimum entry rates are at least 11 percent (‘high_entry’ = 1) appear less 
likely to survive than their counterparts.  This pattern is reflected in the Kaplan-Meier 
                                                           
17
  A convention in duration analyses of this type is to treat all failures in the year of entry as having 
occurred at the beginning of the next year.  Accordingly all failure times for entry at time t are 
treated as failures arising in t+1. 
18
  Our attrition rate for the 1998 cohort (1
st
 three years), corresponds with other UK exit rates: 42 
percent after 2 years cited by Scarpetta (2001) for the early 1990’s and 45 percent in Disney et al., 
(2003) for the period 1986 to 1991.  However, note that these studies only relate to manufacturing 
industries.   
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function which formulates entry as a discrete variable.
19
  However, we should note 
that the Kaplan-Meier does not take account of the auxiliary role of other covariates in 
influencing survival and hence is merely illustrative. 
Figure 1 
0
.0
0
0
.2
5
0.
5
0
0.
7
5
1.
0
0
0 1 2 3 4
analysis t ime
high_entry = 0 high_entry = 1
Kaplan-Meier survival estimates, by high_entry
 
Estimated using data from ONS, UK 
Figure 2, on the other hand, reports the hazard rates for firms entering industries 
marked by high dynamism (summation of entry and exit rates), where our dummy 
variable ‘high_churn’ is set for dynamism rates greater than and equal to the 75
th
 
percentile (dynamism ≥ 20%).  Here we see that higher hazard rates are registered by 
firms entering more dynamic industries, a pattern most likely induced by the 
dominance of industry exit within our measure for industry dynamism.  This pattern is 
also borne out in the positive bivariate correlation coefficient between our dynamism 
variable ‘churn’ and ‘death’ in Appendix 1.  
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  We should note however, the negative correlation coefficient between failure and entry rates 
(Appendix 1) when firm entry rates are formulated as a continuous variable. 
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Figure 2 
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Estimated using data from ONS, UK 
The next step is to analyse whether there is a link between industry dynamism and 
plant survival taking into account other covariates at the industry and plant level, as 
discussed in Section 2.  Table 3 shows the breakdown of the covariates used in our 
analysis.  While overall industry sales growth rates in the ARD are shown to be highly 
volatile across industries and time (as evidenced by the high standard deviation), the 
variables minimum efficient scale, average output of the leading 5 firms in the sector) 
and median wage rates, show less variation relative to the mean.  Our key variable 
measuring industry dynamism, ‘churn’ shows a mean value of 9.8, i.e., the average 
value for industry dynamism (entry plus exit) is about 10 percent.   
 14
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. deviation 
   
Herfindahl index 0.0031 0.0334 
   
C5 0.039 0.063 
   
Churn 9.831 14.279 
   
Industry growth 16.348 114.025 
   
MES 9,361 14,832 
   
Median industry wage 200.906 586.114 
   
Start up size 5.17 40.03 
   
Source: own calculations based on ONS data 
Table 4 shows how concentration varies across the industries in our analysis.
20
  
Concentration records highs in the Tobacco industry and Public Utilities (16 and 40 
respectively) and low values are reported for concentration in the Hotel sector and 
other Services (55 and 93 respectively). 
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 At the request of the ONS, for industries with fewer than 10 firms, we have not published any 
information in case individual firms can be identified. 
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Table 4: Industry Concentration and Dynamism 
Sector hirschman (m_hirsh) 5-firm conc. (c5) dynamism (churn) 
 No. mean std. 
dev. 
No. mean std. 
dev. 
No. mean std. 
dev. 
Manufacture of 
Food (15) 
6,556 1.94 2.0 6,556 20.2 11.1 6,556 26.4 7.7 
Tobacco (16) 101 63.2 26.2 101 95.5 3.5 101 50.4 6.9 
Textiles (17) 3,849 1.18 0.7 3,849 15.5 6.0 3,849 23.5 5.5 
Clothing (18) 3,660 0.56 2.5 3,660 5.7 10.5 3,660 32.9 7.8 
Footwear (19) 455 2.18 1.8 455 22.9 12.1 455 21.5 7.7 
Timber 
products (20) 
3,078 0.36 0.8 3,078 6.5 6.3 3,078 17.4 4.5 
Paper products 
(21) 
1,233 0.68 0.7 1,233 9.0 6.7 1,233 19.1 4.1 
Publishing (22) 13,861 0.355 0.7 13,861 6.8 7.6 13,861 24.0 7.7 
Oil and refining 
(23) 
392 12.7 9.0 392 61.4 11.3 392 27.3 8.7 
Chemicals (24) 3,262 2.25 2.5 3,262 22.3 11.5 3,262 24.6 4.9 
Rubbers and 
plastics (25) 
2,570 0.57 1.1 2,570 6.6 9.0 2,570 16.5 4.5 
Glass and 
ceramics (26) 
3,851 2.65 4.0 3,851 23.6 16.4 3,851 24.1 6.3 
Iron and steel  
(27) 
2,213 2.32 3.9 2,213 21.1 9.8 2,213 22.4 6.7 
Metal products 
(28) 
10,368 0.23 0.6 10,368 4.1 6.1 10,368 17.5 8.9 
Machinery (29) 4,706 0.91 1.7 4,706 11.1 11.3 4,706 16.7 5.2 
Computers and 
office 
machinery (30) 
877 3.33 0.3 877 32.8 2.5 877 37.2 10.1 
Electrical 
equip. (31) 
2,011 1.62 1.9 2,011 19.8 10.7 2,011 19.9 8.9 
Radio and TV 
equip. (32) 
1,143 3 1.2 1,143 29.9 6.8 1,143 22.2 6.6 
Electronic and 
optical devices 
(33) 
2,104 1.41 1.3 2,104 17.3 9.5 2,104 20.4 8.4 
Motor vehicles 
(34) 
1,235 2.61 3.2 1,235 23.5 18.3 1,235 20.9 5.9 
Other transport 
equip. (35) 
1,484 6.45 2.5 1,484 44.5 9.7 1,484 30.8 9.9 
Furniture (36) 9,729 0.32 0.6 9,729 7.1 5.5 9,729 25.0 7.7 
Recycling (37) 625 0.94 0.5 625 12.7 4.2 625 32.8 7.6 
Electricity (40) 415 16.6 9.6 415 68.1 12.0 415 58.6 12.4 
Water (41) 100 17 6.2 100 78.6 11.9 100 60.0 5.1 
Construction 
(45) 
71,233 0.03 0.1 71,233 2.2 1.6 71,233 0.7 5.2 
Vehicle retail 
(50) 
25,836 0.06 0.1 25,836 2.1 2.5 25,836 20.0 5.5 
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 Table 4 (Ctd.): Industry Concentration and Dynamism 
  
sector hirschman (m_hirsh) 5-firm conc. (c5) dynamism (churn) 
 No. mean std. 
dev. 
No. mean std. 
dev. 
No. mean std. 
dev. 
Other 
wholesale 
(51) 
48,991 0.06 0.0 48,991 3.2 1.2 48,991 23.7 6.7 
Retail (52) 161,901 0.15 0.3 161,901 3.2 3.3 161,901 3.4 10.5 
Hotels and 
restaurants 
(55) 
51,012 0.04 0.4 51,012 1.4 2.9 51,012 2.8 8.6 
Transport 
(60) 
18,075 0.38 3.4 18,075 3.2 9.0 18,075 0.6 4.5 
Other 
transport (61) 
828 2.4 1.3 828 26.1 27.3 828 27.3 5.6 
Air transport 
(62) 
737 5.45 2.6 737 42.8 42.8 737 29.1 8.3 
Travel agents 
(63) 
6,642 1.24 1.5 6,642 15.6 15.6 6,642 25.4 6.4 
Post (64) 11,345 11.48 27.8 11,345 22.1 22.1 11,345 46.7 8.7 
Banking (65) 701 71.38 28.6 701 91.4 91.4 701 100.0 0.3 
Insurance 
(66) 
103 6.76 0.3 103 46.1 46.1 103 53.0 0.0 
Other finance 
(67) 
181 6.76 1.6 181 39.1 39.1 181 75.0 2.4 
Real estate 
(70) 
30,575 0.05 0.0 30,575 2.8 1.0 30,575 24.8 5.5 
Rental (71) 8,668 0.37 0.8 8,668 6.8 5.2 8,668 28.8 8.1 
Consultancy 
(72) 
110,641 0.07 0.2 110,641 2.6 3.0 110,641 4.7 14.2 
R&D (73) 1,066 2.8 2.1 1,066 22.5 9.1 1,066 20.7 5.4 
Professional 
(74) 
144,351 0.1 0.2 144,351 3.6 3.1 144,351 5.9 14.2 
Education 
(80) 
19,270 0.38 0.4 19,270 7.0 4.6 19,270 31.6 12.9 
Nursing (85) 28,095 0.05 0.0 28,095 2.7 1.6 28,095 22.7 12.1 
Refuse (90) 798 2.44 2.1 798 24.3 14.5 798 31.6 7.4 
Organisations 
(91) 
86,022 0.09 0.2 86,022 3.2 2.5 86,022 7.9 3.8 
Cinemas (92) 31,944 0.45 1.1 31,944 6.6 6.8 31,944 14.7 14.2 
Other 
services (93) 
43,089 0.01 0.0 43,089 0.9 0.1 43,089 0.0 0.0 
 
5. Analysis 
Our response variable in the model is coded as 1 to signify that the venture has failed.  
This implies that when interpreting the regression output, hazard ratios of less than 1 
mean that the firm’s survival chances improve with increases in the exogenous 
variable.  Conversely, hazard ratios greater than 1 show an adverse effect of the 
covariate on firm survival.  We investigate whether proposition 1 holds in our 
empirical analysis. 
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Table 5 summarises the results of our Cox duration analysis where the hazard rates of 
plants in the 1998 cohort are modelled as a function of the industry variables sector, 
growth, wages, MES and 2 measures of concentration, namely the Hirschman 
Herfindahl index and the 5 Firm Concentration Ratio.
21
  Firm size (number of 
employees) at the start-up stage is also included as is standard practice in models of 
firm survival as discussed in Section 2.  We first analyse all plants in a pooled 
framework before going on to explore possible interactions as markets exhibit higher 
or lower levels of dynamism.  
We see from Table 5 that when we use 2 different measures of concentration, the HHI 
and C5 measure in columns (1) and (2) respectively, that only the latter measure 
exhibits any statistically significant effect.  The market share occupied by the 5 
biggest firms is a sufficiently important determinant that a 10 percent increase in the 
5-firm concentration ratio decreases the survival rate of new ventures by 
approximately 8 percent.  Another relationship to note is the response of new venture 
survival to industry growth.  Consistent with theories of growth and entry, an increase 
in industry growth of 10 percent causes survival to rise by approximately 1 percent.  
This result appears in line with the stylised facts of survival, where growing industries 
exhibit a higher capacity to absorb new entrants (see Caves, 1998).  The high 
variation in this variable as evidenced by the high standard deviation in Table 3, 
indicates that even though the coefficient itself is small, industry growth can be of 
highly important economic significance for plant survival.
22
 
In the next step we question the validity of this pooled regression where the 
competitive regime is taken as a given and no consideration given to industry 
dynamism.  To begin with, we define a dummy variable equal to one if an industry is 
dynamic.  It is defined as such if entry and exit rates combined equal or exceed 20 
percent of the stock of firms.  This corresponds to the 75
th
 percentile of the 
distribution of aggregate entry and exit rates.  Accordingly we interact all covariates 
in the model with the industry dynamism dummy and check the Wald for the 
“augmented” model containing the interaction terms.  The explanatory power of this 
augmented model is better (higher χ
2
) than that of its pooled counterpart.  
Furthermore, the Wald test shows that we can reject the hypothesis that the interaction 
                                                           
21
  While HHI is arguably the most appropriate measure, an alternative is the five firm concentration 
ratio (C5) (Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter, 1986).  We also, in alternative regressions, included 
MES (defined as median size in the industry) in the model, however, the coefficient always turned 
out statistically insignificant.  This may perhaps be due to its correlation with other industry 
variables.  Since inclusion of MES did not change any of the other coefficients of the model we 
drop MES throughout in order to report the most parsimonious model.   
22
  We also find that firm size has the predicted positive effect on firm survival, although the 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.  This may perhaps be due to the fact that our sample is 
dominated by services sector firms, whereas most of the evidence on the size-survival relationship 
is based on studies for manufacturing industries.   
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terms are jointly equal to zero and so we opt on this basis to split our sample along 
dynamic / static lines.
23
 
 
Table 5: Hazard functions for Dynamic and Stable Markets 
 
Stratified Cox: failure = 1   
 
(1)  
Pooled Regression 
(2)  
Pooled Regression 
   
startup size 0.9997 0.9997 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) 
   
HHI 0.9997  
 (0.0002)  
   
C5  1.008 
  (0.0019)*** 
   
industry growth 0.9994 0.9996 
 (0.0002)*** (0.0002)** 
   
median wage 1.000 0.9999 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
   
Obs 554,738 554,890 
Firms 179,143 179,144 
Wald ratio   
Wald (p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
Source: Observations calculated from Inter-Department Business Register (IDBR) data at Office for 
National Statistics.  Industry level data calculated from Annual Respondents’ Database (ARD) at same 
source. 
 
Notes: Stratified by industry sector (SIC92 2-digit). Coefficients are hazard ratios. Also report  Robust 
standard errors: errors clustered within plants across time. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. 
 
In Table 6 we report our results for estimating the hazard model on the separate 
samples of static and dynamic industries respectively.  Interestingly, 6,338 firms can 
be classified using our convention as continuously dynamic for the short period of our 
study.  The majority of firms (98,800) remain classified as static.
24
  For those firms 
                                                           
23
  We do not report these regressions and tests here to save space, but results can be obtained from the 
authors.   
24
  In alternative regressions, dynamism was defined as “dynamism in the year that the new firm enters 
the industry” giving approx. 30,000 firms for the 1998 cohort.  Because an industry’s dynamism 
can evolve (see Geroski, 1995), this implied that some industries move from static to dynamic or 
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entering a static industry, start-up size does not affect survival prospects.  Only firms 
in dynamic industries report start-up size as having adverse consequences for survival.  
This finding is possibly consistent with a concept of over-investment where cash flow 
problems can arise.  The idea here is based on the common use of staged financing in 
the face of a limited supply of capital and an uncertain environment with risk 
milestones.  In such circumstances, start-up at smaller size (not drawing down all 
available finance) allows flexibility in terms of the capability to change/adapt as the 
venture evolves and market opportunities become more predictable.  By contrast 
scaling up to predicted optimal scale at start-up can limit the available pool of future 
finance to allow the firm to change strategy should the business develop differently 
than anticipated.  This conclusion follows if industry dynamism is manifested by 
innovation based competition.  According to Agarwal and Audretsch, (2001)  
 
Table 6: Survival and continual market dynamism 
 
Stratified Cox: failure = 1 always static always dynamic 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HHI 1.145    
 (0.029)**  0.998  
   (0.001)**  
C5  1.022  0.998  
  (0.007)***  (0.001)* 
     
startup size 0.999 0.999 1.002 1.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
     
industry growth 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.999 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
median wage 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
obs 286386 286386 17736 17736 
firms 98800 98800 6338 6338 
Wald (p-value) 30.38 35.41 48.11 44.94 
 
Source: Observations calculated from Inter-Department Business Register (IDBR) data at Office for 
National Statistics.  Industry level data calculated from Annual Respondents’ Database (ARD) at same 
source 
 
Notes: Stratified by industry sector (SIC92 2-digit). Coefficients are hazard ratios. Also report Robust 
standard errors: errors clustered within plants across time. *, **, *** denotes statistical significance at 
10, 5 and 1 % level respectively. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
vice versa. We revised the definition to mean permanently dynamic or permanently static for our 
period of study (3 years). 
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“While the likelihood of survival confronting small entrants is generally less than that 
confronting their larger counterparts, the relationship does not hold for …… 
technologically intensive products” [p. 21] 
Our key variables of interest are the two concentration measures HHI and C5.  
Looking at both of these in columns (1) and (2), we find that entrants into static 
industries encounter significantly lower survival prospects with rising levels of 
industry concentration.  For example, a 10 percent increase in the 5-firm 
concentration ratio in a static market, reduces the survival rate of new ventures by 
approximately 20 percent.   
We now turn to columns (3) and (4) in order to examine survival in dynamic 
industries.  Here, our concentration measures both improve survival.    The point 
estimate of the hazard ratio suggests that an increase in size of C5 or HHI by 10 
percent induces a reduction in the hazard rate of 2 percent (i.e., an increase in the 
survival rate).  This positive relationship between concentration and survival is 
contrary to what we noted for entry into static industries.  It is also consistent with the 
view that the market share of incumbents can promote survival if it provides a 
competitive cushion for new entrants. 
These results support our key proposition: new entrants into dynamic industries fare 
better in terms of survival probabilities when industry exhibits higher concentration 
levels.  The reverse appears to hold true for new entrants into static markets.   
6. Conclusions 
Using a unique dataset of approximately 180,000 UK firms, we track the survival of 
firms from the 1998 cohort.  We model survival using conventional variables used 
elsewhere in the literature but uniquely, allow for potentially important interactions 
between industry dynamism (entry and exit) and the effect of market concentration on 
survival.   
Applying two separate concentration measures, we find that concentration actually 
promotes the survival of new ventures when the industry they enter is classified as 
dynamic.  Specifically, a 10 percent increase in the 5-firm concentration ratio in a 
dynamic market, raises the survival rate of new ventures by approximately 2 percent.  
The corollary to the positive effect that we observe of concentration on survival in 
dynamic industries, is a significant negative effect in static industries.  We conclude 
from this result that only in static industries does concentration harm the survival of 
new ventures.   
Our findings are in line with theories suggesting that x-inefficiencies (symptomatic of 
high concentration rates) can give rise to a competitive cushion which helps sustain 
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new entrants.  Another explanation of our findings is the potentially moderating effect 
of the technological environment on survival, reported in Agarwal and Audretsch 
(2001) and Audretsch (1991).  Here innovation based competition negates the impact 
of scale variables such as start-up size and potentially concentration. 
From a competition policy perspective, our analysis implies that industry 
concentration only poses a threat to the viability of new firms in static markets.  By 
contrast, industry concentration actually helps new ventures overcome other 
impediments to survival such as high risk in dynamic markets.  Thus, from an 
antitrust perspective, the paper provides some key empirical support to the central 
hypothesis of Audretsch, et al. (2001) who contend that competition policy frequently 
needs to be different (in its form and conduct) in static and dynamic markets.       
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1   Correlation matrix  
 death start_~e m_hirsh ind_gr~h mes wage_med sales_~d 
        
death  1       
start_size 0.0066* 1      
m_hirsh 0.0105* 0.0124* 1     
Ind_growth 0.0066* -0.0054* -0.0023 1    
Mes -0.0030* -0.0059* 0.1048* -0.0053* 1   
wage_med 0.0098* 0.1107* 0.0681* -0.0260* -0.0755* 1  
sales_med 0.0246* 0.1221* 0.1014* -0.0272* 0.0153* 0.5912* 1 
entry_r -0.0135* 0.0228* 0.0889* -0.0079* -0.1486* 0.1573* 0.0965* 
churn 0.0503* 0.0388* 0.1706* -0.0099* -0.1937* 0.3295* 0.2822* 
Estimated using data from ONS, UK 
 
Appendix 2 List of Variables  
  
death = 1 Enterprise has exited  
start_size Employment size at time of start-up  
m_hirsh Sum of squared employment shares from ARD within 3-digit sector  
Ind_growth Annual growth from ARD  of 3-digit sector  
Mes Average turnover from ARD  of 5 largest firms in 3-digit sector  
wage_med Median wage from ARD  in 3-digit sector  
entry_r Entry rate from IDBR in 3-digit sector  
churn Entry and exit rates from IDBR in 3-digit sector  
high_churn =1 Dynamism greater than 20 percent 
high_entry =1 Entry rate greater than 11 percent 
Id Local unit identifier (single-plant) 
Source: Estimated using data from ONS, UK 
 
Notes: 
ARD denotes that the variable (an aggregate variable matched on sector) was calculated from selected firms within 
the data captured from the annual survey of respondents (selected sample). IDBR denotes the wider frame of data 
comprising firms from within the selected as well as non-selected database. 
